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ABSTRACT 
Environmental charges to rail service operators are still at an early stage of implementation 
in Europe. Current schemes are dissimilar and most of them have a very limited scope or do 
not provide effective incentives to abate environmental impacts. This is due to several 
practical difficulties in implementing internalisation pricing schemes in the railway sector. 
 
The first difficulty arises from the lack of internalisation in other transport modes and the 
small competitive margin of railways. Increasing the overall level of rail charges could affect 
their survival. A second difficulty is due to the uncertainties in the valuation of external costs 
and in the establishment of the optimal level of charges. On top of that, the imperfect 
competition in the rail market and its operational and financial rigidities imply that pricing 
decisions could be unfair and produce undesired demand effects. These difficulties should 
not prevent, however, advancing towards the application to rail of adequate charging 
methods for its environmental costs. 
 
This paper addresses the problem of setting environmentally differentiated rail charges 
through an analytical approach. A generalised formulation is developed that sets the level of 
charges as a function of the degree of internalisation in other modes. Then, the optimal trade-
off in the level of differentiation is assessed to extract general guidelines. Based on this, both 
the derived overall costs and benefits and the impacts on each agent are quantified. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the approval of the European Directive 91/440/ECC, the separation of the 
infrastructure management (non-competitive part) from the railway operation (competitive 
part) has been compulsory, at least in accounting terms. This division requires the 
introduction of rail access charges for the use of the infrastructure. The European Directive 
2001/14/EC and its subsequent recast Directive 2012/34/EC determine that these charges 
should be based on ‘costs directly incurred as a result of operating the train service’. This 
means that rail operators should be charged for the marginal cost of track maintenance and 
other services derived from the operation but also, according to the legislation, the caused 
external costs of environmental impacts, accidents and congestion may be introduced into 
the pricing scheme. Nonetheless, it is stated that external costs charges for railways should 
not result in an increase of the overall revenue accruing to the infrastructure manager unless 
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a comparable pricing scheme for external costs is applied to competing modes. In this sense, 
the use of pure bonus or a neutral bonus-malus scheme to internalise external costs emerges 
as a suitable pricing option for railways when other modes do not completely internalise the 
externalities they generate. 
 
Regarding the environmental external costs, some countries in Europe have introduced a 
differentiation of charges that accounts for noise and air pollution impacts of the railway 
operation. However, as described by Pons-Rigat et al. (2016), the implementation is still 
limited and the current schemes have a considerable room for improvement to effectively 
incentivise the abatement of noise and air pollution impacts. This is due to several difficulties 
in transferring the theoretical principles of pricing for environmental externalities into a 
practical pricing scheme. 
 
This paper is focused on dealing with these difficulties by providing an analytical approach 
to the problem of setting environmentally differentiated rail access charges. It is structured 
as follows. Section 2 presents the current caveats. The basic theoretical principles are 
described in Section 3. Based on this, Section 4 presents a model to determine the level of 
charges, whereas Section 5 deals with the decision on the degree of differentiation. Finally, 
the economic impacts on each stakeholder are assessed in Section 6 and general conclusions 
are drawn in Section 7. 
 
2. CURRENT DIFFICULTIES 
The main problems to be tackled are: 1) optimally differentiating charges according to 
environmental impacts appraisals; 2) ensuring fair and efficient intermodal competition; and 
3) allocating incentives to all stakeholders in a cost-effective way. 
 
2.1 Differentiation of charges  
According to the Pigouvian framework for pricing externalities (Pigou, 1920), to maximise 
social efficiency, environmental taxes should be equal to the marginal environmental benefit, 
i.e., the socioeconomic valuation of gains due to the reduction of the environmental impact. 
Despite multiple studies on the subject1, they still show a significant level of uncertainty in 
their economic valuation and an insufficient level of disaggregation. Moreover, in the case 
of railways much less research has been conducted in comparison to other modes. Whereas 
air pollution costs can be estimated with an acceptable precision, noise costs are much more 
difficult to handle because of the non-linearity nature of its effects (logarithmic scale) and 
the subjectivity of noise annoyance. Nevertheless, the social welfare gains derived from any 
internalisation scheme are rather insensitive to errors in estimating marginal environmental 
costs (Heine et al., 2012; Rabl et al., 2005). According to this, charges should be 
differentiated in terms of environmental costs even if the cost estimates are relatively 
imprecise. 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Andersson and Ögren (2013); INFRAS and IWW (2004); Ricardo-AEA et al. (2014) 
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Furthermore, the essential issue of how to transfer external costs to a realistic pricing system 
with an optimal degree of pricing complexity is still unsolved (Nash and Matthews, 2005). 
In practice, the marginal environmental cost must be used as the background for the 
establishment of several discrete categories for which the same charging criteria are used. 
The higher the number of categories, the closer the charging scheme could be to the marginal 
cost. Operators and users’ behaviour will be closer to the socially optimal behaviour with 
further differentiation, as market signals become more precise and include a wider range of 
abatement possibilities. 
 
On the other hand, the transaction costs of implementing an environmental pricing scheme 
inevitable increase with the degree of differentiation. The three main sources of transaction 
costs are: a) the administrative costs of the control and management system; b) the costs of 
data collection; and c) the loss of sensitivity of people and organisations with higher levels 
of pricing complexity. So, a clear trade-off appears when defining an optimal level of 
differentiation. 
 
2.2 Fair and efficient competition 
Another difficulty is that the context of imperfect competition and asymmetric information 
in the railway market requires taking into account the downstream effects (in users’ tariffs) 
of the charging system (Meunier and Quinet, 2012). In the context of the rail market, where 
most operators are either monopolies or have a high market power, rail operators will most 
likely transfer all or part of the environmental charges and the eventual abatement costs to 
final users through tariff increases. This can reduce the effectiveness of incentives and may 
have counterproductive effects on demand if competing modes are not adequately charged 
(Matthews et al., 2009). These ‘boundary effects’ on demand and modal split ought to be 
minimised by harmonising the level of environmental internalisation across the transport 
modes. This means that any decision on rail charging should be related to what is applied to 
the other transport modes and even to other sectors. 
 
On the other hand, the regulatory, operational, and financial rigidities of the railway market 
severely affect the potential responses of the operators and, in turn, the effectiveness of the 
environmental pricing scheme. It also raises fairness issues when comparing rail services 
subject to different regulatory or contractual conditions.  
 
2.3 Allocation of incentives 
The responsibility for an environmental impact is usually shared by many agents (or sources 
of pollution), which control different decision variables affecting the final impact. Therefore, 
in theory, the generated external costs should be shared among the agents that have room for 
manoeuvre to reduce the impact; i.e. railway undertakings should only be charged for the 
proportion of environmental costs that results from their decisions. However, splitting 
external costs may not be suitable for incentivising the adoption of abatement measures.  
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For example, the case of an operator running a diesel train on a non-electrified line poses a 
difficult question on how to allocate air pollution costs. If he is not charged for the full cost 
of air pollution, he will not have enough incentive to operate cleaner or more efficient trains. 
On the other hand, the infrastructure manager should also be charged for the full air pollution 
costs to perceive the required incentive for electrification. But, should both be charged for 
the full external costs, the result would be clearly inefficient in terms of social welfare. 
 
3. BASIC PRINCIPLES 
The Pigouvian framework provides a first-best pricing solution to reach an optimal 
environmental abatement. It will be used as a reference in this analysis. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1. Marginal abatement costs (c in Figure 1a) increase with the level of abatement (e.g. 
Siebert, 2004). On the other hand, marginal environmental costs savings (e in Figure 1a) can 
be deemed constant with the level of abatement of air pollution impacts (Heine et al., 2012), 
whereas in the case of noise this assumption would be less reasonable due to the logarithmic 
character of its effects on people. The potential social welfare gain (∆𝑆𝑊, represented by the 
shaded area between e and c curves in Figure 1a) will be the environmental costs savings 
minus the abatement costs. Then, if marginal environmental charges discounts (t in Figure 
1a) are set equal to marginal environmental costs savings, the rail operator will perform 
abatement measures up to the optimal level (A*) where marginal benefits equal marginal 
costs. Under these pricing conditions, private profit and social welfare maximisation will be 
aligned. 
 
Figure 1b shows the same scheme in accumulated terms (capital letters indicate integrated 
magnitudes). A certain rail service will have an initial level of abatement 𝐴𝑜 and charge 
discount 𝑇𝑜, while the most polluting services will have the minimum level of abatement 
𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑛 and so the maximum environmental cost 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
 
In practice the potential social welfare gains of an environmental charging system will have 
some losses deriving from its practical implementation, the main ones being errors in 
environmental damage appraisal, transaction costs, and misalignments of incentives. 
 
Figure 1 – Basic scheme of analysis in marginal (a) and accumulated (b) terms 
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To model the problem in a tractable way a single abatement dimension is considered. Also, 
the marginal abatement cost function is deemed to be linear whereas the marginal 
environmental costs savings are assumed to be constant. One may argue that, in fact, 
marginal abatement costs depend, in turn, on the pricing and regulatory context (Parry et al., 
2014) but this will not be considered in our simplified analysis. 
 
4. LEVEL OF CHARGES 
In the former model, as long as the T curve is parallel to the E curve the social welfare 
maximising point will be the same as the private benefit maximising point. Hence, the 
absolute value of the charge does not affect the optimal abatement point reached but only 
the difference between the social welfare (∆𝑆𝑊) and the private benefit (∆𝑃𝐵). This defines 
the basic structure of the proposed charge if we want to provide incentives to reach the 
optimal abatement level. The necessary condition is that the marginal discount in the charge 
equals the marginal reduction in environmental damage. If we call K the total environmental 
charge (and so k in marginal terms), this is: 
 𝑘 = −𝑡 = −𝑒 → 𝐾 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 − 𝑇 → 𝐾 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 − 𝑇𝑜 − 𝐸 (1) 
If the pricing system is to be generally applied to a certain set of rail services, all charge 
discounts need to have a ‘zero’ point where no bonus is applied. The easiest and most 
effective way to proceed is to set the ‘zero for bonuses’ for the most polluting service. Then, 
a pure bonus charge (𝐾𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠) and a pure malus charge (𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑠) would be respectively: 
 𝐾𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 = −𝑇 (2) 
 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑠 = 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑇 (3) 
A generalised expression that integrates the bonus and malus concept as a function of a 
parameter 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] can be expressed as: 
  𝐾 = (1 − 𝛼) · 𝐾𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 + 𝛼 · 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑠 = 𝛼 · 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑇 (4) 
The previous expression is general because for 𝛼 = 0 it is a pure bonus while for 𝛼 = 1 it is 
a pure malus. As shown in Figure 2, in the case of malus, 𝛼 · 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum surcharge 
to be paid by rail operators. In the bonus region, 𝛼 · 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 can be understood as the minimum 
level to be reached to start getting a bonus. For the abatement level 𝐴𝑒 neither a malus nor a 
bonus is paid. 
 
Figure 2 – Scheme of the proposed charging scheme as a function of alpha  
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At this point, the only decision to be made is what should be the value of alpha. In this 
methodology we propose to set alpha at the average internalisation ratio of competing 
modes. This ensures that no rail service is paying more for environmental costs than the 
average of the competing modes. Hence, only environmentally non-competitive rail services 
are paying a malus. Using this approach, efficient incentives are provided to railway 
undertakings for abating environmental impacts while ensuring a fair competition with the 
rest of transport modes, i.e., a level of charges that does not damage the competitiveness of 
rail transport. 
 
5. DEGREE OF DIFFERENTIATION 
The optimal level of differentiation should be obtained taking into account the trade-off 
between the precision in the provision of incentives and the simplicity of the charging 
system. The net social welfare gains (∆𝑆𝑊𝑛𝑒𝑡) will be then: 
 
 ∆𝑆𝑊𝑛𝑒𝑡 = ∆𝑆𝑊
∗ − 𝐿𝑆𝑊(𝑛) − 𝐶𝐷(𝑛) (5) 
where:  
n: number of differentiated categories in the environmental charge 
∆𝑆𝑊∗: Optimal social welfare gains in first-best conditions (∆𝑆𝑊∗ = 𝐸∗ − 𝐶∗) 










Therefore, the following problem should be solved:  
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑛   [𝐿𝑆𝑊(𝑛) + 𝐶𝐷(𝑛)] 
 
(6) 
An analytical model is developed to quantify this trade-off based on the following 
assumptions: 
 
i. Unidimensional problem: A single abatement measure is considered 
ii. Charges are discrete according to ranges of the abatement process 
iii. All ranges have the same length (L) and imply a certain number of categories (n) 
iv. Both the environmental benefits and the marginal abatement costs are linear 
 
In the first place, the function 𝐿𝑆𝑊(𝑛) should be evaluated. Figure 3 illustrates the 
problem. 
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Figure 3 – Loss of social welfare due to the discretisation of the charge 
In a case of a random discretisation of the charges (with an equal range length L), the 
maximum distance to the optimum abatement point will be reached when the optimal is 
exactly in the middle of the charge range. In this case, the operator will be indifferent 
between the low and the high end of the range (A2 and A3 in Figure 3). Then the average 










Where 𝐿𝑇 is the total length of the abatement range. The derived loss in social welfare is 
represented by the darker triangles in Figure 3. Therefore, the average loss in social welfare 









 ~ 𝑛−2 (8) 
 
From the result above it can be concluded that the marginal benefit of further differentiation 
decreases with increased differentiation. Then if differentiation costs are convex, the number 
of categories should be small. Otherwise, the optimal number of differentiation categories 
will depend on the shape of the differentiation cost function. 
 
6. ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
From the provided analytical approach, the long-term economic impacts on each stakeholder 
when the charging system is implemented can be deduced. This is shown in Table 1. 
 




−𝐶𝐷 − 𝑇0 − 𝐸
∗ ± 𝛿 · 𝑒
+ 𝛼 · 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥  
𝑇0 + 𝐸
∗ − 𝐶∗ − 𝐿𝑆𝑊
− 𝛼 · 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥  
+𝐸∗ ± 𝛿 · 𝑒 𝐸∗ − 𝐶∗−𝐿𝑆𝑊 − 𝐶𝐷 
Table 2 – Long-term economic impacts on the relevant stakeholders (Positive sign for 
benefits and negative sign for costs) 
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This paper addresses some of the difficulties of implementing a practical environmental 
differentiation of rail charges through an analytical approach. A formulation is proposed to 
set the level of charges in a way that proper incentives are provided to rail operators while 
ensuring a fair and efficient competition with the rest of transport modes. Secondly, the 
degree of differentiation is analysed to conclude that the benefits of higher differentiation 
are concave whereas the costs of differentiation should be analysed case by case. Finally, 
the long-term economic impacts on each stakeholder when the proposed charging scheme is 
implemented are presented. 
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